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VI 
JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1996), this Court has appellate jurisdiction 
over the decision the Utah Court of Appeals entered in Estate ofBerkemeirex reL Nielsen v. Hartford 
Ins. Co., 2003 UT App 78,1fl7, 67 P.3d 1012. The appeal to this Court arose from an 
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's Order Granting the Estate's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment, which was 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)0) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1; Did the Utah Court of Appeals and the trial court correcdy determine diat, 
after settlement of the underlying claim against the tortfeasor with the consent of Hartford, 
Utah's Survival Statute - Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 (1996) - does not apply to underinsured 
motorist (UIM) coverage? 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: On May 22, 2001, Hartford filed a Notice Regarding 
Filing of Petition to Appeal from Interlocutory Order (R. 207-08), appealing from the trial 
court's Order Granting the Estate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Denying 
Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 7, 2001, and filed on May 7, 2001. (R. 
189-196). 
Issue No. 2: If Utah's Survival Statute applies to UIM coverage, then what is the correct 
allocation of the $50,000 settlement Mr. Alexander and Allstate paid to Mrs. Berkemeir: Should 
it be applied first to out-of-pocket medical expenses, to attorneys' fees, to interest, or to general 
damages, or should it be apportioned? 
1 
Issue Preserved for Appeal: On May 22, 2001, Hartford filed a Notice Regarding 
Filing of Petition to Appeal from Interlocutory Order (R. 207-08), appealing from the trial 
court's Order Granting the Estate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Denying 
Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 7, 2001, and filed on May 7, 2001. (R. 
189-196). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views 'the facts in a light 
most favorable to the losing party below' and gives cno deference to the trial court's conclusions 
of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness."' Bearden v. Croft, 21 UT 76,^5, 31 P.3d 
537 {quoting Blue Cross <& Blue Shield v. State, 119 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989)). This court also 
reviews for correctness the trial court's and the Utah Court of Appeal's interpretation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-11-12 (1996), Utah's Survival Statute, refusing to apply it to the Estate's claim. 
Id. ("Correctness is also the standard for review of questions of statutory interpretation."). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 78-11-12 of the Utah Code provides: 
Survival of action for injury to person or death upon death of 
wrongdoer or injured person-Exception and restriction to 
out-of pocket expenses. 
(l)(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or death 
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate upon the 
death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person 
or the personal representative or heirs of the person who died 
have a cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general damages, 
subject to subsection (l)(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person dies 
as a result of a cause of action other than the injury received as a 
2 
result of the wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the 
personal representative or heirs of that person are entided to 
receive no more than the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or 
on behalf of the injured person as the result of his injury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 (1996) (emphasis added). 
Section 31A-21-313 of the Utah Code provides: 
Limitation of actions. 
(1) An action on a ivritten policy or contract of first-party insurance must 
be commenced within three years after the inception of the loss. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1996) (emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's Order Granting the Estate's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on May 7, 
2001. (R. 189-196). Hartford appeals the trial court's determination that Utah Code Ann. § 78-
11-12 (1996), Utah's Survival Statute, is not applicable to UIM contract claims. (R.189-196). 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision concluding that Hartford's 
"concessions concerning liability . . . triggered its duties under the contract" and that Utah's 
Survival Statute has no affect on contract claims. Estate ofBerkemeirex rel Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. 
Co., 2003 UT App 78,^17,67 P.3d 1012. This Court should affirm the decisions of both the trial 
court and the Court of Appeals and refuse to apply Utah's Survival Statute to the Estate's UIM 
claims, permitting it to recover Mrs. Berkemeir's damages to the extent Mr. Alexander (the 
underlying tortfeasor) was underinsured at the time of the settlement of the underlying personal 
injury claim. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the facts upon which Hartford and the Estate based their 
respective motions for summary judgment. The facts to which the parties stipulated are 
contained in the Stipulation as to Facts and Legal Positions ("the Stipulation") (Addendum), 
which was filed with the trial court on August 11,2000. (R. 18-27). Pursuant to the Stipulation, 
the facts are as follows. 
On October 16,1995, Mr. James Alexander negligently caused a traffic accident when 
he "suddenly turned directly in front of Mrs. Berkemeir's vehicle," traveling on 1-80 near 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. (R. 19-20). As a result of Mr. Alexander's negligence, Mrs. Berkemeir 
"sustained personal injuries, incurred medical expenses, and was subjected to and endured pain 
and suffering." (R. 20). On October 9,1996, Mrs. Berkemeir executed a settlement agreement 
with Mr. Alexander, releasing him of all claims in exchange for the full $50,000 policy limits of 
his insurance policy. (R.21). Hartford did not object to Mrs. Berkemeir's settlement of all claims 
against Mr. Alexander for the $50,000 limit of his policy with Allstate.1 (R.104A). Pursuant to 
the Stipulation, both parties agreed that due to the significance of Mrs. Berkemeir's injuries, Mr. 
Alexander's insurance policy did not fully compensate for her loss. (R.21). 
1
 This fact is not contained in the Stipulation. The Estate, however, did include this fact 
as exhibits one and two in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (R.104A-104B). Exhibit 
one is a letter from Kristine Edde, former counsel for Mrs. Berkemeir, to Jeffrey Powell of 
Hartford dated October 8,1996. (R.104A). Exhibit two is a letter from Kristine Edde to Mark 
Anderson, counsel for Hartford, dated October 28,1996. (R.104B). Hartford did not dispute 
that it had consented to the settlement, which became admitted pursuant to rule 4-501 (2) (B) of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. SeeLovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130,1(50, 63 
P.3d 705 ("[A]ll facts set forth in the movant's statement of facts are 'deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement.'" (quoting Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 (2)(B)); Fennellv. Green, 2003 UT App 231,^9, 
480 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (deeming movant's facts admitted under Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-
501 (2)(B) because non-movant did not specifically controvert facts in opposing memoranda). 
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At the time of the accident, Mrs. Berkemeir held an insurance policy with Hartford (the 
Policy) for extended coverage for medical payments and personal injury protection. (R.21). 
Under the Policy with Hartford, Mrs. Berkemeir received $5,000 for extended coverage for 
medical payments and $5,000 for personal injury protection. (R.21). These payments were 
"directed to reimbursement of medical expenses" from the accident with Mr. Alexander. (R.21). 
The policy also contained extended UIM coverage with limits of $100,000 per person. (R.21). 
Because Mrs. Berkemeir settled her claim against Mr. Alexander for the full amount of his policy 
but without being fully compensated for her loss (R.22), she made a claim against Hartford for 
the payment of $100,000 under the UIM coverage contained in her Policy. (R.22). As Mr. 
Alexander was underinsured, Hartford agreed to arbitration, originally scheduled for July 21, 
1997. (R.22). Due to an independent medical examination scheduled by Mrs. Berkemeir, the 
arbitration was later rescheduled to September 23,1997. (R.22). 
Mrs. Berkemeir died on August 15, 1997, prior to the agreed upon and rescheduled 
arbitration. (R.22). After Mrs. Berkemeir's death, and prior to the rescheduled arbitration date 
of September 23,1997, the Estate demanded payment from Hartford for $45,580.40. (R.22). 
Hartford denied the Estate's "contractual" claim, (R.23) interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-
12(1) as prohibiting "causes of action arising out of personal injury" by an "heir or 
representative" of an "injured person" for more than "out-of-pocket expenses." (R.25-26). 
On November 2,1999, the Estate filed this claim for breach of contract against Hartford. 
(R.l-6). The Estate seeks damages for Hartford's refusal to comply with the UIM coverage 
provisions contained in the Policy Hartford sold to Mrs. Berkemeir. (R.l-6). In October 2000, 
both Hartford and the Estate filed motions for summary judgment seeking a determination as 
to whether Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 was applicable and determinative. (R.28-81; 82-104B). 
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Judge Timothy R. Hanson heard arguments on January 29, 2001. (R.122). At the 
conclusion of oral argument, Judge Hanson granted the Estate's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, denied Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment, and set for trial the issue of 
damages. (R. 122, 216:3:16-20). At the conclusion of his ruling, Judge Hanson instructed 
counsel for the Estate, Mark A. Larsen, to prepare the order.2 (R. 216:4). The Order Granting 
the Estate's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (the Order) was entered on May 7, 2001. (R. 189-195). 
On May 22, 2001, Hartford filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Utah appealing 
the Order. (R. 207). On July 23,2001, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (2001), the appeal 
was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. (R. 213-14). The Utah Court of 
Appeals rejected Hartford's analysis, stating: "[B]y its own actions, Hartford acknowledged its 
duty under the contract concerning Berkemeir's UIM claim," and affirmed the trial court, stating: 
We conclude that the Survival Statute was adopted to abrogate the 
common law rule of abatement in tort actions that was applied 
following the death of either the tortfeasor or the injured party. 
See id. § 130. Because we can discern no other reason for the 
legislature's adoption of the Survival Statute beyond its desire to 
mitigate the common law rule of abatement, we conclude that the 
2
 Mr. Larsen prepared the Order in accordance with the instruction of Judge Hanson and 
submitted it to counsel for Hartford, Mark L. Anderson, for review. (R. 155). On March 5, 
2001, Hartford objected to the proposed Order, asserting the Order impermissibly expanded the 
scope of Judge Hanson's ruling. (R. 129-148). On March 23,2001, the Estate filed its Response 
to Hartford's Objection, asserting that the proposed Order was consistent with Judge Hanson's 
oral ruling and instruction regarding rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 153-
58). On May 7,2001, Judge Hanson ruled that the proposed Order "properly set forth the basis 
for granting summary judgment," and accordingly, overruled Hartford's objections. (R. 203). 
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elimination of the abatement of tort actions was the intended 
target of the Survival Statute. 
Estate of Berkemeir ex rel Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. Co., 2003 UT App 78,ffl[10,14, 67 P.3d 1012. 
Hartford now appeals to the Utah Supreme Court arguing that both the trial court and the Court 
of Appeals erred in refusing to apply Utah's Survival Statute to the Estate's claims. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Everyone agrees: "[T]he purpose of UIM [Underinsured Motorist] insurance . . . is to 
place the injured party in the same position as if the tortfeasor had additional liability insurance." 
Brief of Appellant at 11. To place Mrs. Berkemeir in the same position as if Mr. Alexander had 
additional liability insurance, the question becomes how far underinsured was Mr. Alexander at 
the time of the settlement of the claim arising from the automobile accident. To answer that 
question, Hartford and Mrs. Berkemeir agreed to arbitrate because Hartford conceded that fair 
compensation for Mrs. Berkemeir's injuries exceeded the limits of Mr. Alexander's policy. 
By that time, however, with Hartford's consent, Mrs. Berkemeir had settled with Mr. 
Alexander and fully released him. Not only could she not pursue any claim against him further, 
but Mr. Alexander also could not undo the settlement already reached, e.g., pay a lesser amount 
based upon Mrs. Berkemeir's death, application of the limiting provisions of the Survival Statute, 
or for any other reason. 
The Utah Survival Statute does not apply to the contractual dispute between Mrs. 
Berkemeir and Hartford. "Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the person or 
death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another do not abate upon the death of the 
wrongdoer or the injured person. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 (1996) (the Survival 
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Statute) (emphasis added). This Court should affirm the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' 
decisions and reject Hartford's argument that the Survival Statute bars the Estate's recovery: 
• The plain language of the statute is that "Causes of action arising out of 
personal injury . . . caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another. . . ." 
Mrs. Berkemeir did not sue Hartford for her personal injury; Mrs. Berkemeir's 
personal injuries were not caused by Hartford. Hartford is an insurer, not a 
tortfeasor. Mrs. Berkemeir's claim is a contractual claim. She sued Hartford for 
breach of the UIM provisions of the insurance contract, seeking to recover for 
the amount Mr. Alexander was underinsured. Only one element of her 
contractual damages is the measure of her personal injury: To the extent the value 
of her injury exceeds Mr. Alexander's liability insurance policy limits, she is 
entitled to underinsured motorist coverage up to the UIM policy limits. 
• The plain language of the statute and its legislative history establish that the death 
of the injured party does not abate contractual causes of action. 
• The Survival Statute is aptly named because it is intended to prevent the 
abatement of a cause of action upon the death of the injured person. To suggest 
that a non-abatement statute abates a cause of action makes no logical sense: It 
is tantamount to a double negative. 
Further, applying the Survival Statute to limit UIM coverage is inconsistent with common sense 
and unsupportable by Utah law. 
Under the first-party insurance contract,3 the Estate is "legally entided to recover" as it 
has a "viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment." Hartford's action in consenting to 
the settlement with Mr. Alexander, conceding that Mrs. Berkemeir's injuries exceeded the limits 
of Mr. Alexander's policy, and agreeing to enter into binding arbitration, establish that a viable 
claim exists. Further, had Hartford intended to limit or terminate UIM coverage upon the death 
of the insured, it could have easily contracted for such a provision. 
3
 "[T]he term "first-party" [refers] to an insurance agreement where the insurer agrees 
to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses suffered by the insured." Beck v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Utah 1985). 
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The application of personal injury tort principles to interpret contractual claims for UIM 
benefits invites a confusing analysis the Utah Courts consistently have rejected. For the first 
time, Hartford relies upon the analysis set forth in Beaudry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 518 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1994), to support its claims. The position Hartford 
belatedly argues from Beaudry, however, is contrary to Utah law. To adopt the ill-conceived 
position in Beaudry is an invitation to undermine well-developed Utah case law rejecting the 
application of tort law to insurance contract interpretation. In addition, courts in other 
jurisdictions have rejected that invitation and held that the breach of an insurance contract 
survives the death of an insured. 
Finally, if Utah Code Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(b) (1996) applies, the UIM provision of the 
insurance policy does not entitle Hartford to retroactively dictate that Mrs. Berkemeir's recovery 
from Mr. Alexander must first be applied to out-of-pocket expenses. Hartford has not taken 
into account interest on the special damages, the attorneys' fees she paid from the $50,000 
settlement, or the most significant element of her claim against Mr. Alexander: General damages 
consisting of the pain and suffering Mrs. Berkemeir endured as a result of the injuries she 
sustained in the collision. At a minimum, Mrs. Berkemeir is entitled to be made whole, before 
settlement proceeds should be allocated for Hartford's benefit. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-11-12 (1996) IS NOT APPLICABLE TO 
THE ESTATE'S CONTRACTUAL CLAIM FOR UIM 
BENEFITS. 
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correcdy concluded that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-11-12 (1996) (the Survival Statute), does not apply to the Estate's contractual claim for UIM 
benefits. See Estate ofBerkemeirex rel. Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 2003 UT App 78,^9, 
67 P.3d 1012. This Court also should reject Hartford's arguments that the Survival Statute 
applies because (1) Hartford's interpretation extends the Survival Statute's meaning beyond its 
plain words and finds no support in its legislative history; (2) the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals correcdy determined the claim was contractual as evidenced by the date the cause of 
action accrued; and (3) any other interpretation of the Survival Statute would be inconsistent 
with common sense and unsupportable by Utah law. 
A. The Trial Court and Court of Appeals Correctly Concluded That the 
Survival Statute Does Not Apply to Contractual Claims for UIM Benefits. 
If Mrs. Berkemeir had died prior to her settlement with Mr. Alexander and prior to 
Hartford conceding its liability and agreeing to arbitrate to determine the extent to which Mr. 
Alexander was underinsured, undoubtedly the Survival Statute would have applied to her cause 
of action against Mr. Alexander, limiting but not eliminating her recovery against him.4 Because 
4
 Even if Hartford's strained interpretation of the application of the Survival Statute was 
adopted, it only impacts Mrs. Berkemeir's remedy against Mr. Alexander; it does not impact 
whether she is "legally entided" to recover against him. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(b) 
(1996). 
10 
Mrs. Berkemeir died after settlement with Mr. Alexander had been reached, however, the 
Estate's recovery is not affected by the Survival Statute because the statute does not apply to 
contract claims. 
The Survival Statute explicitly states: "Causes of action arising out of personal injury 
to the person or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another &o not abate upon the death 
of the wrongdoer or the injured person—" Utah Code Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(a) (1996) (emphasis 
added).5 Because both Hartford and the Estate have set forth plausible interpretations of the 
breadth and meaning of the phrase "arising out of personal injury . . . caused by the . . . 
negligence of another" within the context of the Survival Statute's application for UIM benefits,6 
5
 It should be noted that the Survival Statute was not created to limit causes of action, 
but rather to reject the common law rule that causes of actions for personal injuries abate upon 
the death of either the wrongdoer or the injured party. Kynaston v. United States, 111 F.2d 506, 
509 (10th Cir. 1983). Contrary to Hartford's argument that the Survival Statute limits recovery, 
the Survival Statute was intended to encourage and extend the rights of injured parties, even 
after death. Further, due to its historical basis, the Survival Statute was clearly meant to 
encourage the survival of actions brought for personal injury, and has no affect, nor was it ever 
meant to affect, contractual claims. 
6
 Hartford cites Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 
TJ14, 27 P.3d 594, to support its contention that the phrase "arising out o f is inherendy 
unambiguous and broad. Although it is true that the court vMeadow Valley determined that the 
phrase was unambiguous, the court relied heavily upon the context of the phrase (an insurance 
policy) to make that determination. See id. at ^|14. Further, this Court has held that a 
determination of ambiguity naturally depends upon a determination of extrinsic factors. See 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmer's Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995). This Meadow Valley court 
was not interpreting the phrase "arising out of personal injury . . . caused by the . . . negligence 
of another" as related to the survival of causes of action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12. 
Ambiguity in the interpretation of statutes arises when it is "capable of two or more 
plausible meanings." Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 933 P.2d 788,791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(quotations and citations omitted). As determined by the Court of Appeals, both parties have 
set forth "reasonable interpretations," Estate of Berkemeir ex re I. Nielsen, 2003 UT App 78,^12, 67 
P.3d 1012, and this Court may still find that the phrase "arising out of personal injury... caused 
by the . . . negligence of another" is ambiguous and requires the Court to examine its legislative 
(continued...) 
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the phrase is inherently ambiguous, requiring the Court to examine the legislative intent of the 
statute. 
"Statutory language is ambiguous if it can reasonably be understood to have more than 
one meaning." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998); see also Estate of Berkemeir ex rel 
Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 2003 UT App 78,^12, 67 P.3d 1012; Derbidge v. Mutual 
Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Miller Welding Supply, Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 860 P.2d 361,362 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "When statutory ambiguity exists, [this Court] 
must determine the 'legislature's intent in light of the entire statute's purpose.'" Derbidge, 963 
P.2d at 792 (quoting Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
"At common law, any action in tort for a personal injury dies with the deceased." 
Kynaston v. United States, 111 F.2d 506, 509 (10th Or. 1983) (emphasis added); accord Estate of 
Berkemeir, 2003 UT App 78 at ^[13. The common law rule applies both to the death of the 
injured party as well as the death of the tortfeasor. See Kynaston, 111 F.2d at 509. To remedy the 
harsh results of this common law rule, Utah's legislature enacted its first "survival statute" in 
1953. Id. "The purpose of the statute was not to create a new cause of action . . . but rather to 
abrogate the common law rule of abatement. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). 
The original language of the Survival Statute stated that "[c]auses of action arising out of 
physical injury to the person or death, caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another, shall 
6(...continued) 
intent. The ambiguity becomes apparent as Hartford continues to assert that the Survival Statute 
applies to the Estate's claim, where Mrs. Berkemeir previously setded her personal injury claim 
against Mr. Alexander, Hartford conceded its liability to Mrs. Berkemeir for UIM benefits under 
its insurance contract with Mrs. Berkemeir, and the parties agreed to arbitrate to determine the 
extent to which Mr. Alexander was underinsured - based upon yet another provision contained 
in the insurance contract. 
12 
not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer . . . ." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 
(1953)) (emphasis added). Despite several amendments to the Survival Statute since 1953/ the 
specific tort language regarding "the wrongful act or negligence of another" has survived, 
without the addition of any language regarding breach of contract.8 
"The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the legislature is the plain language 
of the statute." Ueber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr.y Inc., 2000 UT 90,f7, 15 P.3d 1030. "Each 
expression of a term 'should be interpreted as the exclusion of another. Therefore, omissions 
in statutory language should "be taken note of and given effect/"" State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 
27,1J21, 64 P.3d 1218 (quoting Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT H0,1fl4, 993 P.2d 875 
(quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217, 219 (1973))). 
Accordingly, if the legislature intended the Survival Statute to limit causes of action based 
upon insurance contracts, as Hartford suggests, the legislature would have done so explicitly. 
Ironically, there is no legislative history supporting such an interpretation of the Survival 
Statute.9 Rather, it appears that the legislature has consistently, and most recently in 2001, 
chosen not to include language regarding contracts or insurance policies when revising the 
7
 The Survival Statute grew out of Utah's Wrongful Death Statute, which is currently 
codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-11-6 & -7 (2003), and contains identical tort language 
regarding "the wrongful act or negligence of another." Kynaston v. United States, 1\1 F.2d 506, 
509 (10th Or. 1983). 
8
 Since its enactment in 1953, Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 has been amended four times: 
1967,1977,1991 and 2001. 
9
 At pages 7-8 of the Brief of Appellant, Hartford provides a legislative history of the 
Survival Statute. This legislative history is noteworthy because of what ifails to say. Curiously 
absent from this legislative history is any indication that the legislature intended the Survival 
Statute to apply to first-party insurance contracts. 
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Survival Statute.10 The legislature's use of such specific terms as "arising out of personal injury 
caused by the wrongful act or negligence of another/' and the lack of any language altering 
intent to limit the application of the Survival Statute to personal injury claims based upon the 
wrongful acts or negligence of another. 
Fi irther, ajiph 11 lg basic canoi is of stau ltorj interpretation, the genera 1 ph rase "cai lses of 
action" is restricted by the more specific language regarding intentional or negligent conduct. 
See Field p. BoyerCo., I X , 952 P.2d 1078,1087 (Utah 1998) (stating, "general terms in a statute 
shoi lid i:»e given, a meat lii lg that is restricted to a sense analogoi is to tl le [more] specific tern is"') 
(quoting Nephi City v. Hansen, 119 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989) (alteration in original)); accord State 
v, Fisher, • J F.„..: 0 / \ °P ti ? \i. Ct. App. 1998). Under iiu* uounnc < ! ejusdem generis, the 
phrase .i< ^ - • - •• . *ad restrict! v el \ • • • causes of actioi i 
involving "the wrongful act or negligence of another." See Field, 952 P.2d at 1087 (emphasis 
added). As such, the Utah legislature clearly envisioned application oi • nc Nir\ i\ al Statute to tort 
claims. 
The legislative history and intent of Utah's Survival Statute reveals a simple purpose: To 
abrogate the common law rule ofabatement of tortious personal injury claims upon the death 
of the tortfeasor or injured party. There is no indication that enactment or amendment of the 
statute was intended to affect contract claims. 
10
 In addiri<>n, the legislature has not included provisions limiting the recovery of UIM 
benefits in Title 31 A, the Utah Insurance Code, which governs UIM coverage. 
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B. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals Correctly Determined That the 
Survival Statute Does Not Apply Because the Claim Was Contractual, as 
Evidenced by the Date the Cause of Action Accrued. 
There is an extraordinarily strange anomaly in this case: If the arbitration occurred as 
originally scheduled, Hartford would have compensated Mrs. Berkemeir for the damages she 
sustained in the automobile accident to the extent they exceeded Mr. Alexander's insurance 
policy. Only the postponement of the arbitration and Mrs. Berkemeir's untimely death creates 
even an arguable position for Hartford. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 Does Not Apply to the Estate's 
Claim Because the Estate's Claim Accrued When Hartford 
Breached the First-Party Insurance Contract. 
Mrs. Berkemeir's claim for breach of contract accrued on the date Hartford refused to 
pay the Estate pursuant to the UIM provisions of the first-party insurance contract: Mrs. 
Berkemeir made a demand for payment, which Hartford refused. At that time, Mrs. Berkemeir 
clearly had a claim against Hartford for UIM benefits because she was not fully compensated 
for her injuries by the settlement with Mr. Alexander. No one has ever questioned Mr. 
Alexander's obvious liability, to which the parties in this case stipulated. (R. 20:11). 
Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in holding that the Survival 
Statute does not apply because the damages for that breach of first-party insurance contract are 
measured on the date of the breach, which is when the cause of action accrued. See Becton 
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) (holding that claim accrues on the 
occurrence of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action). Any other application 
would be inconsistent with basic contract principles. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(4)(c) 
(1996) (Mrs. Berkemeir could not have initiated this action against Hartford until after Hartford 
denied payment in full.); Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1996) ("An action on a written policy 
15 
or contract of first-party insurance must be commenced within three years after the inception 
of thelc )ss.").n 
Prior to hei • settlemei it w, ith Mi ". \lexai ider at i 11 lartford's reft isal t : pay \ JIM benefits, 
Mrs. Berkemeir did not have any claim against Hartford; she only had a personal injury claim 
against Mr. Alexander. Because the uaiin i< I l.\l benefits is clearly contractual, me cause 
• :)f action accrued i ipon I la rtford' s bread i, nc t on the date • :>f tl le accidei it w, 1: lei 1 tl le personal 
injury claim against Mr. Alexander accrued. As a matter of law, no insurance policy may limit 
the right of action against the insurer to less than three years from, the date the cause of action 
accn les I Jtal 1 Code Ann § 31 :\ 21 314(3). \X/ I len I lartford breached theii ISI irance :ontract by 
refusing to pay her demand for UIM benefits, however, the last event necessary to create Mrs. 
Berkemeir's cause of action against Hartford occurred I 'herefore, this Court si a >uu; determine 
that the Survival Statute is inapplicable because the Estate's claim is clearly contractual. 
2 T h e Statute of Limitations on the Estate's Claim Began 
Running on Hartford's Refusal to Pay the U I M Benefits in 
Breach of the Insurance Contract. 
The trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in finding that the Survival Statute 
did not apply because the Estate's claim is contractual. In TYih., the statute of limitations on 
Mrs Berkemeir's claim for bread I of contract begat it: in it i ingi lpoi i.I lartford srefusal topay Mrs. 
11
 Compare Tucker v. S tate Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54,^12,53 P.3d 947 (stating statute 
of limitations on causes of action under first-party insurance contract is three years) with Jenkins v. 
Perciva/, 962 P.2d 796,805 n.3 (Utah 1998) ("The statute of limitations for filing a personal injury 
action is four years."). 
12
 See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985) ("[I]n a first-party 
relationship between an insurer and its insured, the duties and obligations of the parties are 
contractual rather than fiduciary"); Bergera v. Ideal Nat'I Life Ins. Co., 524 P.2d 599,600 (Utah 1985) 
(stating an insurance policy is "merely a contract between the insured and the insurer"). 
16 
Berkemeir UIM benefits.13 It is nonsensical to argue that the Estate should not recover UIM 
benefits because the agreed upon binding arbitration did not occur due to Mrs. Berkemeir's 
untimely death, where the claim is clearly for breach of contract.14 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1996) sets forth the statute of limitations for bringing a 
claim on an insurance policy, stating: "An action on a written policy or contract of first part 
insurance must be commenced within three years after the inception of the loss." In Lang v. 
Aetna Ufe Insurance, 196 F.3d 1102 (10th Cir. 1999), the court discussed the "inception of loss" 
language of § 31A-21-313, stating: "The statute of limitations was triggered not by the personal 
injury giving rise to the suit but rather by the insurer's alleged breach [of contract] in refusing 
to defend against the suit." Id. at 1105 (emphasis added). Similarly, the inception of Mrs. 
Berkemeir's loss and the breach of contract claim was not triggered by the personal injury Mrs. 
Berkemeir suffered but rather by Hartford's breach of contract in refusing to pay the UIM 
benefits.15 
C. Any Other Interpretation the Survival Statute Is Inconsistent 
with Common Sense and Unsupportable by Utah Law. 
Applying the Survival Statute to contract claims is inconsistent with Utah law. Indeed, 
application of the Survival Statute to a contract claim makes no sense. "|T|t is a general rule that 
a cause of action founded on a contract survives the death of either party and a pending contract 
13
 Mrs. Berkemeir could not have initiated this action against the insurance carrier, 
Hartford, until after Hartford denied payment in full. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(4)(c) 
(1996). 
14
 The arbitration procedure actually tolls the statute of limitations against Hartford. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(5) (1996). 
15
 Mrs. Berkemeir could not have initiated this action against the insurance carrier, 
Hartford, until after Hartford denied payment in full. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(4)(c) 
(1996). 
17 
ac t ion d o e s n o t aba te o n the d e a t h o f a par t ) " 1 C. J.S. Abatement and Revival § 147(a) (1994) 
(ci ta t ions o m i t t e d ) ; accord Estate ofBerkemeirexrel. Nielsen v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 2 0 0 3 U T 
App S,1|l - ii I' I I0L2, see uao JTJMIW r Amierbm^ 28 I Uah 4V.\ Ht» i" M! , M)^ tin PM^i 
(permitting wife to bring cause of action under contract after the death of her husband, the 
contractor). Further, actions that are only "nominally laid in tort," but actually lay in contract, 
are nc t general!) si lbject to abatemei it 1 ( ! J S. Abatement and Revival § 14 / (b); accord i estate of 
Berkemeir, 2003 UT App 78 at 1J13. 
The Court's "primary responsibility in construing legislative enactments is to give effect 
1 ( >i h( :legislat ure'i n it u lerlj ii ij ;ii ltei it ' : Wllettv. Clark Clinic C <?#>., 609 I > 2d 93 \ ,936( I Jtah 1980). 
"It is to be observed, moreover, that statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render 
all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations are to be avoided which render 
soi i le pat t of: a pro \ isioi I t lonsensical or absurd ' h /. I :H ignorii lg tl ic intei it of tl: ic Si it vival 
Statute, Hartford would have this Court interpret the Survival Statute as intending to prevent 
the abatement of tort claims in such a manner as to cause the unnecessary abatement of the 
Estate's contract claii n I hrough application of the personal inji irv Si irvrv al Statute. I lartford 
seeks to place itself in a better position than Mr. Alexander and his insurer. It seeks to apply to 
the Survival Statute at the expense of Mrs. Berkemeir and her beneficiaries. In doing so, the 
expectations of the Estate, based upon the ungual ! -• \*r* ' 
This nonsensical and absurd result is entirely contrary to the intent of the Utah legislature and 
shod : • IJ: .*-. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN 
DETERMINING THAT UNDER THE FIRST-PARTY 
INSURANCE CONTRACT THE ESTATE IS "LEGALLY 
ENTITLED TO RECOVER" BECAUSE IT HAS A 
"VIABLE CLAIM THAT IS ABLE TO BE REDUCED TO 
JUDGMENT." 
The insurance contract anticipates that personal injury will give rise to a claim for UIM 
benefits against the insurance carrier. Under the Policy, Hartford 
will pay compensatory damages which an insured is legally entitled 
to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor 
vehicle because of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by an insured; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
(Emphasis added.) 
To be "legally entitled to recover," a claim must be "viable" in that it is '"able to be 
reduced to judgment in a court of law."' Ueberv. ITT Hartford Ins, Or, Inc., 2000 UT 90,^4,15 
P.3d 1030 (quoting Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192,195 (Utah Ct. App.1996) 
(drawing upon cases interpreting "legally entided to recover" in uninsured context to determine 
meaning of same phrase in underinsured context)). This court should affirm the Court of 
Appeals determination that the language "legally entided to recover" under the first-party 
insurance contract covering UIM benefits, does not bar the Estate from recovering contractual 
damages because a "viable" claim exists that is "able to be reduced to judgment."16 Ueber, 2000 
16
 It appears from its brief that Hartford may be arguing that the Supreme Court should 
not affirm the Court of Appeals' determination that Hartford acknowledged its duty to pay UIM 
(continued...) 
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UT 90 at [^4 (quoting Peterson, 927 P.2d at 195). Outlining its reasoning the Court of Appeals 
stated, 
[I]o qualify under the "legally entitled to recover" language of a 
UIM contract, a party is not required to establish that a legal 
determination has been made. Rather, absent specific language to 
the contrary contained within the contract, a party is "legally 
entitled to recover" if they can show the existence of a "Viable 
claim that is able to be reduced to judgment.1" We see no reason 
that this showing cannot be made with either a judgment entered 
by a trial court, or a formal or informal settlement agreement 
between the parties. 
Estate of Berkemeir ex rel. Nielsen v. Hartford in<, Co. of Midwest, 2003 U T A p p 78,^9, 67 P.3d 1012 
(emphasis added) (citations oi i litted) I 'he ( k>i irt of \ ppea Is \\ as correct n I its determination 
because (i) Hartford conceded Mrs. Berkemeir was "legally entitled to recover" after she settled 
with Mr. L Alexander and (i I) Hartford agreed to arbitrate to determine the extent to winch Mr. 
Alexander was underinsured at the 'time of his settlement with Mrs. Be rkei nei r.' ' It w ; is :i it t i n n 
16(... continued) 
benefits when it did not object to Mrs. Berkemeir's settlement with Mr. Alexander and agreed 
to enter into binding arbitration. Hartford asserts the court 's determination was not based upon 
arguments presented to the Court of Appeals or a factor in the trial court 's determination. Brief 
of Appellant, 9. However , "[i]t is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment 
appealed from cif it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even 
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its 
ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on 
appeal by [a party], was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by 
the lower court . '" Bailey v. Bailes, 2002 U T 59,1jl0, 52 P.3d 1158 (quoting Vipoma v. McPhie, 2001 
U T 61,^(18,29 P.3d 1225). Further, Hartford raised the issue of the Estate being "legally entitled 
to recover" when it argued in its brief both before the Court of Appeals and its brief before this 
Court , the viability of the Estate 's claim under Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr.y Inc., 2000 U T 90,^4, 
15 P.3d 1030 and Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 927 P.2d 192, 195 (Utah C t ^pp. 
1996) 
17
 Hartford acknowledged its liability and the parties agreed to arbitrate the extent of 
Hartford's liability because, as stipulated to by Hartford, the settlement with Mr. Alexander did 
not fully compensate Mrs. Berkemeir for her loss. (R.21). An agreement contained in a record 
(continued...) 
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time, and the Court of Appeals correcdy determined, that the claim was viable in that it was 
"able to be reduced to judgment" by proceeding with arbitration.18 Id. (emphasis added). 
Hartford argues that the Survival Statute precludes the Estate from recovery under the 
contract, claiming that the Estate is not "legally enrided to recover" under the contract because 
the claim is not "able to be reduced to judgment."19 There is no dispute regarding Mr. 
Alexander's liability for Mrs. Berkemeir's personal injury. Undoubtedly, Mrs. Berkemeir had a 
"viable claim" against Mr. Alexander in light of the fact that the personal injury claim was 
17(...continued) 
to submit to arbitration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the 
agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-107 (2002). 
Hartford has never challenged the validity of the agreement to arbitrate. Rather, it only refused 
to proceed with the arbitration. The refusal of Hudson to fulfill its agreement to enter into 
arbitration (R.22) and pay to the Estate UIM benefits existing under the contract was a breach 
of the first-party insurance contract. 
18
 Hartford relies upon Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1995), to support the 
proposition that "the essential terms of a settlement of a UIM claim must at least include the 
amount of money that the insurer is to pay." Brief'of'Appellant, 10-11 (emphasis in original). 
Sackler involved a dispute between partners in a rental condominium, one of whom began to 
personally occupy the condominium. 897 P.2d 1217,1218. A dispute arose between Sackler 
and Savin regarding the amount Savin should pay for his use of condominium. Id. Sackler relied 
upon a series of letters to claim there was an enforceable settlement agreement. Id. at 1220. The 
Court found: "The correspondence between the parties demonstrates the parties were still in 
preliminary negotiations . . . the parties had not come to an agreement on the essential terms of 
the contract." Id. at 1221. The Court noted: [TJhere was an apparent misunderstanding as to 
the substance of the agreement. . . ." Id. 
The Utah Court of Appeals did not rely upon a series of letters to find there was a 
meeting of the minds between Ms. Berkemeir and Hartford regarding Hartford's liability to Mrs. 
Berkemeir, which inures to the benefit of the Estate. "Under the Policy, neither party could 
demand arbitration unilaterally; the consent of both parties was required." R. 74. Hartford 
conceded its liability to Mrs. Berkemeir and agreed to arbitrate in accordance with the insurance 
contract. R. 21,^14 and R. 22, ]J17. After Ms. Berkemeir died, Hartford refused to proceed with 
the arbitration to determine the extent of its liability to the Estate. R. 23,^| 21. 
19
 Hartford makes this bold assertioafter conceding its liability, stipulating to participate 
in a voluntary arbitration to determine damages. (R.22). 
21 
reduced to a settlement for the limit of Mr. Alexander's policy; the parties in this case stipulated 
to his liability (R.22); the parties agree that Mrs. Berkemeir's damages were not fully 
as to "die amount owed to Mrs. Berkemeir under her first-party insurance contract for UIM 
benefits. 
I f.itifoul ""In \n\\<\\ lick'' I'M Mrs H< \lt men h,i»l ,i " " iN' " I urn Ini w I in li >JM '.vu^  ICIMIIY 
entitied to recover UIM benefits because before Mrs. Berkemeir died, Hartford agreed to enter 
into arbitration to resolve the matter. Hartford agreed to arbitrate after Mrs. Berkemeir settled 
1: i >onal inji :i i: \ cla i i i 1 agaii ist Mr \ le xai: u K setdement agreement h '.[> mnis, 
prevented Mrs. Berkemeir from bringing a personal injury claim against Mr. Alexander which 
was capable of being reduced to a judgment. The setdement agreement, by its terms, released 
Mr. Alexander from fi irti lerl iabil it\ to Mrs. Berker • II lerhei rs for damages associated v itl 1 
the automobile accident. Upon her execution of the settlement agreement, Mrs. Berkemeir was 
no longer "legally entitled" to recover from Mr. Alexander or "rap.n,^ of reducing her claim 
against him to judgment." Hartford was appraised of the setdem< -. * •j > ot object R at! ler, 
with full knowledge of the setdement and its terms, Hartford acknowledged its liability to Mrs. 
Berkei nei r for I Hi <1 bet lefits ai id agreed to arbitrate to determine the extent Mr. Alexander was 
underinsured at the time of his settlement with Mrs. Berkemeir. 
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correcdy rejected Hartford's argument because 
Estate's i hiiii r "'Iilil(,n tn lx itcluccni im jia 1 j.^ !iit/i11 |iisi JS harttord agreed when it 
acknowledged its liability to Mrs. Berkemeir and entered into the contractual remedy of 
arbitration merely to determine damages. See Undon City v. Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 
1073 (Lt -' * f *• ;u:..cnt of disputes by 
22 
extrajudicial means. Arbitration is a remedy freely bargained for by the parties, and "provides 
a means of giving effect to the intention of the parties, easing court congestion, and providing 
a method more expeditious and less expensive for the resolution of disputes." (citation 
omitted)). Mrs. Berkemeir's claim became "able to be reduced to judgment" when Hartford (1) 
consented to Mrs. Berkemeir's settlement with Mr. Alexander - the very settlement which 
released Mr. Alexander from further liability and extinguished her ability to reduce her claim 
against Mr. Alexander to judgment; (2) conceded that Mrs. Berkemeir's injuries exceeded the 
limits of Mr. Alexander's policy; and (3) acknowledged its liability to Mrs. Berkemeir for UIM 
benefits and agreed to enter into arbitration pursuant to the express terms of the insurance 
contract. See also Tistate of Berkemeir, 2003 UT App 78 at f^lO. Thus, the Court of Appeals 
correctly determined that "by its own actions, Hartford acknowledged its duty under the contract 
concerning Mrs. Berkemeir's UIM claim." Id. 
A. Any Other Interpretation of the First-Party Insurance 
Contract Is Illogical and Not Supported by Utah Law. 
Hartford sponsors two illogical positions, the adoption of both of which are necessary 
to reach the conclusion that the Estate has no contractual claim against Hartford: 
1. Hartford argues that the Estate's damages are measured at the time the arbitration 
award is entered, not at the time the cause of action against Hartford accrues, 
causing Utah Code Ann. § 78-1 l-12(l)(b) (1996) to apply to the interpretation of 
the language "legally entitled" contained in the UIM provision of the insurance 
policy; and 
2. Hartford argues that, even if Utah Code Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(b) (1996) applies, the 
UIM provision of the insurance policy entitles Hartford to dictate that any 
recovery obtained by an insured must first be applied to out-of-pocket expenses 
and subsequently to all other damages incurred.20 
20
 Hartford argues, "In this case, [Mrs.] Berkemeir's death precluded a viable claim against 
(continued...) 
23 
Accepting these flawed positions requires this Court to ignore accepted standards for 
interpretation of insurance contracts and to disregard when a cause of action accrues. If driven 
to lis logical com IUMOII, ;KA epiiug I he aigunit ttt lh.il iliinagcs .ire mi asuicd at the- I HUT ut iihc 
arbitration award, would mean that no insured who settles with the underlying tortfeasor will be 
able to maintain a claim for I JIM coverage. For example, every settlement with an underlying 
tortfeasor resi llts n 1 a fi ill release of tl le tortfeasor; tl i/t is, tl lere is t 10 longer a "\ labie cla i m '" If 
this Court accepts Hartford's argument, once that release is signed, the insured is no longer 
"legally entitled' to recover from the underinsured tortfeasor because there is no longer a "valid 
claim." 
Such a result is illogical. Only by measuring whether the insured is legally entitled to 
recover at the time the cause 01 action accrues against Hartford and the statute of limitations 
begins to run does the inter: : * - ' i \r <•«:•• n *\ < 
the fact that Hartford chose to participate in the arbitration proceeding and agreed that Mrs. 
: n • IM-1 u;ir s damages were not covered by the Mr Alexander's policy and subsequent settlement, 
indicates that, prior to Mrs. Berkemeir's death, Hartford 1 )el ieved the cai ise of action aga it ist 
Hartford had accrued. 
its argument that damages are measured at the time 01 ihe arbitration, 
Hartford relies upon three cases: Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co., 927 JLJ._A I ')? '\ rah 
Ct. App. 1996); Ueberv. ITT Hartford Insurance Center, Inc., 2000 UT 90,15 P.3d 1030; and State 
20(...continued) 
the tortfeasor (except for out-of-pocket expenses, the full amount of which she had already 
received)." Brief of Appellant at 5. This is a suggestion that the $50,000 Mrs. Berkemeir 
received from the underlying settlement with Mr. Alexander, the tortfeasor, paid all of her 
medical expenses recoverable under Utah Code Ann. § 78-1 l-12(b)(l996). See Point IV for a 
discussion of the problems accepting this premise would create. 
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Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (1996). These cases, however, can be easily 
distinguished from this case. The plaintiffs in both Ueber and Clyde never had a viable claim 
against the tortfeasor. The Worker's Compensation Act barred Lieber's claim, and the Clydes 
were grandparents who could not lawfully maintain a wrongful death claim for their 
grandchildren. 
As discussed previously, Peterson is helpful for its interpretation of the "legally entitled to 
recover" language, the definition of which, was subsequently adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Ueber, 2000 UT 90 at ^8. Although relied upon heavily by Hartford, Ueber does not 
support its position that the insurance contract bars the Estate's claims. Rather, l i ^ rp rov ides 
an analytical framework for interpreting the application of the Worker's Compensation Act to 
claims by employees. 
Lieber never had a "viable claim" against his employer because the Worker's 
Compensation Act barred it. Ueber involved an employee who was involved in an accident with 
two parties who fled the scene. See id. at ^[5. The employee attempted to recover uninsured 
motorist benefits based upon an insurance policy Hartford issued to his employer. See id. at ^ 6. 
The trial court denied the employee's claims, determining that the Workers' Compensation Act 
provided the employee's exclusive remedy. See id. at ^[5. 
This Court examined the application Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305(3) & (4) (1999),21 
which stated in relevant part: 
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage . . . provides coverage for 
covered persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from 
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily 
injury . . . . 
21
 This statutory language changed in 2000. 
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(4)(b)(ii) This [uninsured motorist] coverage does not apply to an 
employee, who is injured b) an uninsured motorist, whose 
exclusive remedy is provided by . . . the Workers' Compensation 
Act. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
The Court interpreted these statutory provisions in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. 
'_, >1A .!• Hb(l) <>l the Workers' Compensation Act, \\hiu. contains the following exclusive 
remedy provision: "The right to recover cot i lpensatioi 1 pi i rsi lai it tc tl 3 is cl lapter for it lji iries 
sustained by an employee,. . . shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be 
tl le exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or employee of the employer " I Jeber, 2000 
UT 90 at TJ10. Based upon the phut; iim^iL^c : 
Workers' Compensation \ct provides the exclusive remedy for injured employees to recover 
against their employers. See id. mi |^ I 1 Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, the 
Court then held that an injured employee does not have a viable claim against their et nj: )lo v er or 
its agents, but has a viable claim against third parties. See id. 
Lieber does 1 101 si lppor I: tl le argi 11: 1 lei it tl: lat UIM coverage is a tort claim and barred by the 
Survival Statute. Rather, Ueber examines the "legally entitled to recover" language of the 
employer's insurance policy in conjunction with the Worker's Compensation Act. In Ueber, this 
Lmii'l determined llul the reined} for thr injur t d empl< nee WJKS shttutot ily niutuhited as available 
solely through the Worker's Compensation Act, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-
305(4)(b)(ii) (Supp.1999) (stating "[uninsured motorist] coverage does not apply to an employee, 
w h o i s 111 : ' • • . . . , % ( . ' . , . . • • :*• " 1 • • • 
Workers' Compensation Act). See Ueber, 2000 UT 28 at TJ9. Therefore, this Court reasoned that 
a "viable claim" against an employer could not exist because the "exclusive remedy" is statutorily 
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mandated to exist under the Worker's Compensation Act. See id. Therefore, contrary to Mrs. 
Berkemeir, Lieber never had a "viable claim" against his employer because the Worker's 
Compensation Act barred it. 
Hartford also relies upon State Farm Mutual Insurance v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1986), 
to support its claim. In Clyde, this Court held that grandparents are not legally entitled to recover 
UIM benefits for the wrongful death of their grandchildren. The grandparents lacked 
standing under Utah's Wrongful Death Statute. Under the plain language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-11-6, grandparents are not the parents or guardians of their grandchildren. Id. at 
1186. This Court determined that because of the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 
the grandparents never had a viable claim which can be reduced to judgment. See id. 
The facts and analysis in both Ueber and Clyde do not support the application of their 
holdings to this case. Hartford fails to acknowledge that the Utah Supreme Court in Ueber and 
Clyde arrived at its holdings based upon the plain language of the statutes at issue. Rather than 
supporting Hartford's position, these cases support the proposition that the Survival Statute, by 
its very terms, does not apply to the Estate's contract claim against Hartford for UIM benefits. 
Moreover, in Ueber and Clyde, the Court did not engage in a conclusory analysis of the "viable 
claim" language implicated by the "legally entitled to recover" provision of the statute. Rather, 
the Court engaged in a careful analysis of the facts under the relevant statutory provisions and 
applicable case law. Here, Hartford asserts that "this court should reverse the trial court's ruling 
on this issue, and find that the survival statute applies to limit any requisite Viable claim' that the 
Estate could bring against the underinsured tortfeasor, and in turn, limits the Estate's claim for 
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UIM benefits." Brief of Appellant, 20. However, the analytical framework of Lieber and Clyde in 
conjunction with the plain language of the Survival Statute, do not support this contention. 
Continuing with the tradition Hartford's sister corporation established in Lieber v. TTT 
Harford Ins. Or., Inc., 2000 UT 90,15 P.3d 1030, Hartford tortures the analysis and holdings of 
these cases. The "inaccurate assertions in Hartford's brief referred to in Ueber, appear in this 
case in the form of an incomplete and inaccurate statement of facts, and an attempt to torture 
the analysis and holding of key cases in an effort to avoid paying UIM benefits. If this Court 
accepts Hartford's argument, the UIM provisions of insurance policies can never be implicated. 
Based upon the express language of the insurance contract, the Estate is entitled to 
recover against Hartford the amounts which Mrs. Berkemeir would have been legally entitled 
to recover from Mr. Alexander. Mrs. Berkemeir is legally entitled to recover general damages 
against Hartford because she was legally entitled to recover general damages from Mr. Alexander 
at the time of settlement. Hartford cannot escape this reality by utilizing the "legally entitled to 
recover" language of the policy to raise a defense which the tortfeasor, Mr. Alexander, could not 
raise. Such an analysis is not only contrary to the fundamental paradigm governing the practice 
of personal injury law, UIM coverage22 and the public policy encouraging settlement,23 but is also 
22
 As an insurance company, Hartford is very familiar with the manner in which personal 
injury and insurance defense litigation proceed. Nonetheless, Hartford utilizes the "arising 
from" language of the contract to breathe life into their argument that the Estate must be 
"legally entitled to recover" under the language contained in the Policy. 
It should be noted that the Policy does not require a judgment against the tortfeasor in 
order for Mrs. Berkemeir to recover UIM benefits. If Hartford intended to require Mrs. 
Berkemeir to secure a judgment against the tortfeasor as a condition precedent to paying UIM 
benefits, it should have drafted such a provision into its Policy. Rather, Hartford did not draft 
such a provision into its Policy and now seeks to apply the Survival Statute to Mrs. Berkemeir 
in such a way as to create a condition precedent which prevents the Estate from recovering 
(continued...) 
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contrary to Hartford's actions before Mrs. Berkemeir's death. The net effect of such a requirement is to 
prevent settlement of underlying personal injury claims where the injured party has UIM 
coverage. 
B. The Interpretation of the Insurance Contract Is Strictly Construed Against 
Hartford, Who Easily Could Have Contracted for the Limitation or Termination 
of UIM Coverage upon the Death of the Insured. 
If Hartford wanted to limit or terminate eligibility for UIM benefits upon the death of 
the insured, it easily could have drafted such a provision into the insurance contract, a contract 
of adhesion. Undoubtedly, Hartford prepared the insurance contract with the assistance of 
many lawyers and actuaries, and anticipated payment of UIM benefits under these exact 
circumstances - the policy does not contain a provision which supports Hartford's current 
position, the plain language of the Survival Statute does not support Hartford's current position, 
the location of the Survival Statute within the Utah Code does not support Hartford's current 
position, Hartford's regular payment of UIM claims based upon settlements with tortfeasors for 
policy limits rather than judgments does not support Hartford's current position, and finally, the 
22(...continued) 
damages for which Mrs. Berkemeir and the Estate have not been compensated. This Court 
should reject Hartford's argument as going against the policy of interpreting insurance contracts 
for the benefit of the insured. See U.S. Fid. <&Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 522 (Utah 1993) 
("Insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured 
because they are adhesion contracts drafted by insurance companies."). In all likelihood, this 
provision is not in the Policy because it is contrary to the practice of Hartford. Although facts 
concerning the business practices of Hartford are not in the record and properly before this 
Court, it is difficult to believe that Hartford requires ail of its policyholders to secure judgments 
before receiving UIM benefits under its policies. 
23
 "The public policy is to encourage settlements." Slusher v. Ospital by Ospital, 111 P.2d 
437, 441 (Utah 1989) (citing General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039, 1046 (Md. 1980); 
accordAlvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Common, 681 P.2d 1244,1248 (Utah 1984); RioAlgom 
Corp. v. ]imco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980)). 
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Utah case law does not support Hartford's current position. Rather, Hartford's current position 
represents its effort to enlist this Court to re-write the insurance contract it drafted. To allow 
Hartford to re-write the insurance contract to limit, if not eliminate, the protection afforded an 
insured and her beneficiaries under these circumstances, is wholly contrary to the longstanding 
policy of the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals to interpret such contracts of 
adhesion liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries. 
In 17. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer and 
in favor of the insured because they are adhesion contracts drafted by insurance companies. See 
id. at 522. The Court also explained that '"insurance policies should be construed liberally in 
favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of 
insurance.'" Id. at 521-22 (citations omitted). 
The interpretation of the "legally entided" language in the UIM provision of the 
insurance contract is a significant issue to both parties' interpretation of the contract. Applying 
the rules of interpretation of insurance contracts established in Sandt, if there is any argument 
over the construction of the insurance contract, that ambiguity should be resolved in favor of 
the Estate and against Hartford. 
POINT III 
APPLYING TORT PRINCIPLES TO INTERPRET A 
CONTRACT CLAIM UNDER AN INSURANCE 
CONTRACT IS CONTRARY TO UTAH LAW AND 
INVITES A CONFUSED ANALYSIS THAT UTAH 
CONSISTENTLY HAS REJECTED 
As agreed by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this is a contract claim, not a tort 
claim. Utah Code Ann. §.78-11-12 (1996), Utah's Survival Statute, applies to causes of action 
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based upon personal injury claims and limits the available damages where the victim of a tort 
dies of unrelated causes prior to the entry of a judgment. It, however, does not alter the 
available damages where the claim is contractual in nature,24 as opposed to a personal injury tort 
claim. 
A. This Court Is Not Required to Follow the Analysis of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Beaudry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company?3 
Hartford relies upon the analysis set forth in Beaudry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company, 518 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1994), to support its contention that Utah's Survival 
Statute bars the Estate's claim for UIM benefits. By suggesting this Court to follow the logic 
found in Beaudry, Hartford invites this Court to ignore the distinction Utah court's have placed 
between contract and tort law in the past. Hartford invites this Court to become entangled in 
the same quagmire that led the Minnesota Supreme Court to reverse Beaudry, along with three 
other similarly flawed Minnesota Supreme Court cases. 
In Beaudry, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the following issue: 
When an underinsured motorist claimant dies of causes unrelated 
to the auto accident, does her underinsured motorist claim survive 
the abatement of the underlying tort claim against the tortfeasor? 
The answer to this question depends on whether the underinsured 
motorist claim is viewed as a cause of action arising out of an 
injury to the person, which does not survive the death of the 
24
 SeeBergerav. Ideal NaflLfe Ins. Co. , 524 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1985) (stating an 
insurance policy is "merely a contract between the insured and the insurer"). 
25
 It goes without saying that this court is not required to follow the reasoning of 
Minnesota Supreme Court. See Society o/Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 
1993) (determining that given the different constitutional provisions and history from other 
jurisdictions the court rejected both parties' use of cases from other jurisdictions); State Farm Fire 
<& Cas. Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952,957 n. 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (determining that public policy 
and logic require the court to refuse reasoning of other jurisdictions). 
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person, or as a contract action, which does survive the person's 
death.26 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In considering whether a UIM claim sounds in contract or tort law, the Beaudry court 
indicated, "Whether an uninsured or underinsured motorist claim is to be viewed from its 
contract or tort aspects depends on the question being asked."27 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
The Beaudry court then analyzed prior Minnesota Supreme Court decisions to determine whether 
the cause of action abated on the insured's death. 
In O'Neill p. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 381 N.W.2d 439 (Minn.1986), the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that "for the purpose of what statute of limitations appliefs] to an 
underinsured claim, the claim 'sounds in contract and is governed by the 6-year statute of 
limitations for contracts; [but] at the same, in deciding when the statute of limitations begins to 
run, we held it was 'when the accident giving rise to the injury happens/" Beaudry, 518 N.W.2d 
at 13 (quoting O'Neill, 381 N.W.2d at 440).28 In deciding when the statute of limitations begins 
to run, the O'Neill court expressed the following concern: 
26
 The Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that the "underinsured motorist claim of [the 
insured] was a contract action not subject to the survival statute." Beaudry v. State Farm Auto. Ins. 
Co., 506 N.W.2d 673, 675 (Minn. Ct. App.1993). 
27
 This type of analysis necessitates frequent appellate court intervention as the trial courts 
attempt to discern which questions warrant application of contract principles and which 
questions warrant application of tort principles. 
28
 In holding that the statute of limitations on an UIM claim begins to run at the time of 
the accident which gives rise to the alleged injuries, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected 
sound principles of contract law. Under Minnesota law, an insurer breaches the insurance 
contract upon its refusal to pay a valid claim under the policy. See Olson v. Rugloski, 211 N.W.2d 
385, 387-88 (Minn.1979); see also Western World Ins. Co., Inc. v. Hall, 353 N.W.2d 221,223 (Minn. 
Ct. App.1984) ("Insurance policy is a contract and court's function is to determine what the 
agreement was and enforce it."); Fillmore v. Iowa Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 344 N.W.2d 875, 877 (Minn. 
Ct. App.1984) (same). 
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O'Neill argues that a cause of action for breach of contract accrues 
upon a breach and points out that an insur ance contract is 
breached when an insurer refuses to pay a rightful claim. Olson v. 
Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385 (Minn. 1979). Because a refusal 
normally does not occur until a claimant demands payment, 
O'Neill concedes that the statute of limitations might not begin to 
run indefinitely. 
Id, 
The problems associated with applying tort and contract principles were compounded 
soon after O'Neill, when the Minnesota court heard the cases of Mcintosh v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co,, 488 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1992) and Employers Mutual Co. v. Nordstrom, 495 
N.W.2d 855 (Minn. 1993), where it held that a "UIM claimant is required to pursue his or her 
claim against the tortfeasor to settlement or judgment before seeking UIM benefits from the 
underinsurer." Oanes v, Allstate Ins, Co,, 617 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Minn. 2000) (emphasis added). 
Relying upon these cases, the court in Beaudry held that Minnesota's Survival Statute29 
applied to limit the Estate's claims against Allstate.30 The Court stated "that the primary cause 
29
 Minnesota's survival state states: 
A cause of action arising out of an injury to the person dies with 
the person of the party in whose favor it exists . . . . All other 
causes of action by one against another, whether arising in contract 
or not, survive to the personal representative of the former and 
against those of the latter. 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 573.01 (West 1992). 
30
 In deciding Beaudry, the court also relied upon Webber v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 97 F. 140 
(8th Cir. 1899). Webber involved the estate of a plaintiff injured in a train accident who 
subsequently died of unrelated causes. The Eighth Circuit held that the Estate could not evade 
the survival statute by alleging a cause of action for breach of a contract to transport the plaintiff 
safely. The Eighth Circuit applied the following test in its analysis: "In the absence of statutes, 
the true rule is that if the primary and moving cause of the damages sought is the breach of the 
agreement, and the injuries to the person are mere incidents to that breach, the action survives, 
but if the proximate moving cause of the damages claimed is the personal injury, and the breach 
(continued...) 
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of the damages sought to be recovered as UIM benefits is the injury [the insured] suffered in the 
auto accident." Id. at 14. As a result, the Beaudry court created a confusing conundrum by 
requiring trial courts to selectively and simultaneously apply both principles of contract and 
personal injury law to UIM claims. 
Faced with the results of these incongruent rulings, in Oanes v. Allstate Insurance Companyf, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court revisited the statute of limitation issue it decided in O'Neill: 
In the past, we have indicated that the claim accrues and the 
limitations period commences at the time of the accident that 
causes the injury. See Weeks v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 580 
N.W.2d 24,27 (Minn.1998); O'Neill v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 381 
N.W.2d 439,439 (Minn.1986). Yet we have also held that a UIM 
claim is not ripe until is has been determined that the tortfeasor is 
in fact underinsured by settlement or adjudication of the claim 
against the tortfeasor. See Employers Mut. Cos. v. Nordstrom, 495 
N.W.2d 855, 857 (Minn. 1993). Because the confluence of these 
decisions creates the possibility that the statute of limitations could 
run on a UIM claim before it becomes ripe, we conclude that the 
better rule is that UIM claims accrue and the statute of limitations 
30(...continued) 
of the contract and the damages therefrom are mere incidents to the injury, the cause of action 
dies." 
The Beaudry court adopted the standard set forth in Webber, stating: 
The test for survivability is in the substance, not the form, of the 
cause of action. Id. The test, said Webber, is whether breach of contract 
or injury to the person is the nprimary and moving cause of the damages 
sought" Id. This is consistent with the test adopted vStowlie v. First 
Minneapolis Trust Co., 184 Minn. 82, 85, 237 N.W. 846, 847 (1931), 
where we said that "the nature of the damages sued for rather than 
the form of the remedy is the test." 
Beaudry, 518 N.W.2d at 13 (emphasis added). 
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begins to run when the UIM claim becomes ripe by settlement or 
adjudication of the claim against the tortfeasor. 
617 N.W.2d at 402 (emphasis added). The Minnesota Supreme Court also acknowledged that 
it previously "did not consider, the interplay between the rule that the statute of limitations for 
UIM claims begins to run on the date of the accident that caused the claimants injuries and the 
rule precluding a UIM claimant from proceeding with a claim until the underlying tort action has 
been resolved by settlement or judgment" Id. at 405. 
With the new rule pronounced in Oanes, the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled its 
previous holdings relating to application of the statute of limitation from the date of the 
accident, as set forth in O'Neill v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 381 N.W.2d 439 (Minn. 1986) and 
Beaudry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1994), and brought the 
Minnesota courts back to contractual principles in holding that the UIM claim arises once the 
personal injury claim against the tortfeasor is settled or a cause of action is initiated.31 Oanes, 617 
N.W.2d at 406. The Minnesota court, previously unwilling to apply contract concepts of breach 
and conditions precedent in order to achieve a sound result in O 'Neill, applied tort principles of 
accrual to a contract claim and achieved results it did not foresee.32 
31
 Presumably, if the Minnesota court would have relied upon its case law. . . Minnesota 
contract cases and the court of appeals versions of Beaudry here. 
32
 The Utah Court of Appeals refused to confuse the analysis, as the Beaudry court did, 
by blurring the distinction between tort and contract claims, stating: 
Here, while there is no dispute that the origins of Berkemeir's 
claim against Alexander "arose out of personal injury," the subject 
of the present dispute does not actually arise from her physical 
injuries. Rather, the present dispute arose only after Hartford's 
duty under the contract was triggered and Hartford then allegedly 
failed to meet its obligation. Thus, the Estate's claim arose solely 
(continued...) 
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Given this procedural history, Hartford still maintains that this court should apply 
Beaudry. Aside from the obvious problems of applying tort principles to contract claims, 
Hartford also asks this court to apply Beaudry despite the fact that Beaudry is factually dissimilar 
from this case in one material and substantial respect: "At the time of [the insured] 's death, 
'liability under that [UIM] coverage/... still remained to be determined, and her UIM claim was 
still unresolved and pending." Beaudry, 518 N.W.2d at 14 (citations omitted). This is a stark 
contrast from this case because Hartford conceded its liability for UIM benefits to Mrs. 
Berkemeir and agreed to arbitrate to determine the extent of its liability to Mrs. Berkemeir, prior 
to her death. (R.22) Hartford's concession of liability for UIM benefits forms the basis for the 
Utah Court of Appeals determination that "by its own actions, Hartford acknowledged its duty 
under the contract concerning Berkemeir's UIM claim." Estate of Berkemeir ex rel Nielsen v. 
Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 2003 UT App 78,1J10, 67 P.3d 1012 (emphasis added). 
Further, this court need not follow Beaudry because Utah lacks the intermediate cases 
relating to statutes of limitations that brought Minnesota to its decision in Beaudry. Rather, the 
Utah legislature has determined when the statute of limitations for contract actions arises: "An 
action on a written policy or contract of first part insurance must be commenced within three 
years after the inception of the loss." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1996). In Lang v. Aetna 
32(... continued) 
from Hartford's alleged breach of the contract and not from 
Berkemeir's personal injury. Therefore, because the Estate's claim 
sounds in contract, not tort, it is unaffected by the Survival Statute. 
But see Beaudry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 11,13-
14 (Minn. 1994) (concluding, under nearly identical circumstances, 
that the cause of action was limited by Minnesota's Survival 
Statute). 
Estate of Berkemeir, 2003 UT 78,1fl5, 67 P.3d 1012. 
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Life Insurance,l96 F.3d 1102,1105 (10th Or. 1999), the court discussed the "inception of loss" 
language of § 31A-21-313, stating: "The statute of limitations was triggered not by the personal 
injury giving rise to the suit but rather by the insurer's alleged breach [of contract] in refusing 
to defend against the suit." Id. at 1105 (emphasis added). 
Further, applying co ntract principles to first-party insurance contracts avoids the 
problems found in Beaudry and is consistent with this Court's ruling in Beck v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). In Beck, the insured raised a bad faith claim against: the 
insurer based upon the insurer's failure to investigate the claim and settle it. See id. at 797. 
Although the Court acknowledged the need for an effective remedy against an insurer who 
"refuses to bargain or settle in good faith with the insured," the Court refused to adopt the tort 
approach adopted by other courts "in order to allow an insured to recover extensive 
consequential and punitive damages, which they consider to be unavailable in an action based 
solely on a breach of contract." Id. at 798-99. The Court rejected the tort approach, stating: 
We conclude that the tort approach adopted by these courts is 
without a sound theoretical foundation and has the potential 
for distorting well-established principles of contract law. 
Moreover, the practical end of providing a strong incentive for 
insurers to fulfill their contractual obligations can be accomplished 
as well through a contract cause of action, without the analytical 
straining necessitated by the tort approach and with far less 
potential for unforeseen consequences to the law of contracts. 
Id. at 799. In Beck, this Court implicitly rejects the analysis set forth in Beaudry. Although in Beck 
the "primary and moving cause of the damages sought" was personal injury, the Court explicitly 
rejected application of tort principles to an insurance contract for purposes of creating a remedy 
against insurers who in bad faith refuse to settle: 
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[I]n a first-party33 relationship between an insurer and its insured, 
the duties and obligations of the parties are contractual 
rather than fiduciary. Without more, a breach of those 
implied or express duties can give rise only to a cause of 
action in contract, not tort. 
Id. at 800 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, to avoid the problems arising from the application of tort principles to a 
contractual claim, this court should affirm the Court of Appeals decision in rejecting Beaudry. 
Hartford seeks to eliminate any further liability to the Estate by applying the tort provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12 to the insurance contract. In doing so, Hartford extends an 
invitation to the Utah Supreme Court to venture down a path of uncertainty—a path which 
involves applying tort concepts to a contract claim under circumstances where the Utah 
legislature has not expressed and intent to apply the non-abatement provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-11-12 to insurance contracts. 
B. Other Courts Have Held That the Breach of an Insurance 
Contract Survives the Death of the Insured. 
This Court should affirm the Court of Appeals and the trial court's determination that 
the Survival Statute is not applicable to the Estate's breach of contract claim. Courts in other 
jurisdictions agree that claims for breach of first-party insurance contracts are contractual and 
survive the death of the insured. 
In Groce v. Fidelity General Insurance Co., 448 P.2d 554,557 (Or. 1968), the Oregon Supreme 
Court addressed a suit brought by an insured's assignees against an insurer for its failure to settle, 
33
 "[T]he term "first-party" [refers] to an insurance agreement where the insurer agrees 
to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for losses suffered by the insured." Beck v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 n.2 (Utah 1985). 
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in breach of the insurer's contractual obligation to investigate and negotiate with the insured in 
good faith. See id. at 556. Though these facts are distinguishable in that the insured assigned his 
rights against the insurer to the plaintiff assignees, the court addressed the issue of whether 
claims for violations of contractual rights under a first-party insurance contract should be treated 
as tort or contract claims. See id. at 557. The court determined that 
[ejven if the insurer's breach of its reciprocal obligation of good 
faith may be said for certain purposes to be tortious, the cause of 
action arising from such a breach is one that affects the insured in 
his property, as distinguished from his person, and so ought to be 
as capable of assignment and survival as any other contract right. 
Id. The cause of action brought by the Estate is one for the contracted coverage of UIM 
benefits; thus, one that "affects" Mrs. Berkemeir's property. Id. This is distinguished from a 
claim of personal injury against Hartford and, therefore, should survive just "as any other 
contract right." Id. 
In Clements v. ITT Hartford, 973 P.2d 902 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998), the Oklahoma Court of 
Appeals addressed the issue of whether a cause of action against an insurer based upon bad faith 
survives the insured's death. The court also addressed the issue whether the estate's claims, in 
seeking to enforce the insurance policy, could survive the insured's death. See id. at 903, 905. 
In Clements, the insurer acted in "bad faith in delaying payment of the uninsured/underinsured 
motorist benefits." Id. at 903. The insured died prior to filing suit against the insurer, however, 
the insured's personal representative brought a claim. See id. The trial court determined that the 
cause of action for a bad faith breach of the insurance contract was tortious and did not survive 
under Oklahoma's survival statute.34 See id. On appeal, however, the court determined that a 
34Oklahoma's Survival Statute states: 
(continued...) 
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cause of action for a bad faith breach of the contract survived the death of the insured. See id 
at 903-05. In addition, the court determined that "attorney fees and any other loss incurred by 
an insured to enforce the contract against the insurer's bad faith [in breaching the contact] is 
'injury to . . . [the] personal estate" that would survive the insured's death . . . [as] [t]here clearly 
has been an injury whereby [the] personal estate has been diminished by the wrong.'" Id. at 905 
(citation omitted) (fourth alteration in original). Similarly, the Estate is clearly harmed by 
Hartford's refusal to pay UIM benefits available under the first-party insurance contract existing 
between Mrs. Berkemeir and Hartford. The Estate's claims to enforce the contract to should 
survive. See id. 
Finally, the California Supreme Court also addressed survival of contractual obligations 
in insurance contracts. In Culley v. New Rork Life Ins., 163 P.2d 698 (Ca. 1945). A contract for 
disability insurance contained a provision for arrearage payments to be made with interest, but 
did not contain a provision limiting the time for which arrearage payments would be accepted. 
See id. at 703. The insured filed a claim with the insurer attaching an arrearage payment and 
interest. See id. The insurer refused to accept payment and later denied the insured's claim 
determining that the policy had gone into default prior to the insured's disability claim. See id. 
The appellate court determined that the denial of coverage, in breach of the insurance contract 
which permitted arrearage payments, "gave rise immediately to a cause of action." Id. The court 
34(... continued) 
In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, 
causes of action for mesne profits, or for an injury to the person, 
or to real or personal estate, or for any deceit or fraud, shall also 
survive; and the action may be brought, notwithstanding the death 
of the person entided or liable to the same. 
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1051 (West 2002). 
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then held that "[sjince the cause of action arose while the insured was alive, it is immaterial that 
the complaint was filed after his death." Id. 
Similarly, Hartford's refusal to enter into arbitration, after admitting that Mrs. 
Berkemeir's damages were not covered by Mr. Alexander's insurance policy (R.22) and agreeing 
to arbitration, was the breach that "gave rise immediately to [the] cause of action." It was not, 
as Hartford argues, the accident causing Mrs. Berkemeir's personal injury-that claim was settled 
with Hartford's consent. Rather, the Estate's claim is brought solely based upon Hartford's 
breach of the first-party insurance contract which contains a UIM coverage provision. The Utah 
Court of Appeals and the trial court should be affirmed because the Estate is claiming damages 
for breach of contract based upon Hartford's failure to pay UIM benefits under the Policy. This 
court should affirm and hold that claims for breach of insurance provisions and coverage, 
survive the death of the insured.35 
35This is opposed to claims against an insurer for personal injury which do not survive. 
See Country Side Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 587 So.2d 987 (Ala.1991) 
("Fraud claim against insurer and insurer's agent based on alleged misrepresentation that life 
policy purchased by insured was "better" than insured's prior policy did not survive insured's 
death, where any representation regarding policy was made to insured, and insured filed no 
action with regard to that claim."); Davis v. Southern United Life Ins. Co., 494 So.2d 48 (Ala. 1986) 
("Claim based on fraud perpetrated on insured who purchased memorial policy would not 
survive in favor of personal representative of insured's estate."). 
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POINT IV 
IF UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12(1)(B) (1996) APPLIES, 
THE UIM PROVISION OF THE INSURANCE POLICY 
DOES NOT ENTITLE HARTFORD TO DICTATE 
THAT ANY RECOVERY OBTAINED BY AN INSURED 
MUST FIRST BE APPLIED TO OUT-OF-POCKET 
EXPENSES. 
Accepting Hartford's argument leads the Court into another conundrum: How should 
the previously recovered setdement proceeds from the tortfeasor be applied? If Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(b) (1996) applies to limit the Estate's recovery of UIM benefits, the Estate 
is entided to full compensation for the expenses Mrs. Berkemeir incurred as a result of the 
collision. Utah Code Ann. § 78-ll-12(l)(b) states: 
If prior to judgment or setdement the injured person dies as a 
result of a cause other than the injury received as a result of the 
wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the personal 
representatives or heirs of that person are entided to receive no 
more than the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of 
that person as the result of his injury. 
Prior to judgment or setdement, Mrs. Berkemeir died of causes unrelated to the injuries she 
sustained in the collision. (R.22). As a result of the collision, Mrs. Berkemeir incurred medical 
expenses totaling $38,249.29. (R.20). Prior to her death, Mrs. Berkemeir setded with Mr. 
Alexander for the limit of his Allstate policy, $50,000, (R.21), but none of these setdement 
proceeds were designated as for the payment of these medical expenses. The only designated 
insurance proceeds were the $10,000 in medical insurance coverage. (R.21). 
The fact that Mr. Alexander's liability for personal injury was so clear as not to require 
Mrs. Berkemeir to obtain a judgment against Mr. Alexander should not penalize the Estate, 
preventing it from securing underinsured motorist benefits where Mrs. Berkemeir was not fully 
compensated for the damages she sustained as a result of the collision. 
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Hartford argues Mrs. Berkemeir, through the Estate, received the full amount of the out-
of-pocket expenses she incurred as a result of the collision. Brief of Appellant at 5. Hartford 
previously argued that because Mrs. Berkemeir received $60,000 in insurance benefits from 
Hartford and Allstate, and Mrs. Berkemeir's medical expenses totaled $38,249.29, the Estate has 
been more than fully compensated for the totality of the out-of-pocket expenses Mrs. Berkemeir 
incurred as a result of the collision. (R.20-21). Hartford, however, has not taken into account 
the attorneys' fees she paid from the $50,000 settlement. Nor has Hartford taken into account 
the most significant element of her claim: Her general damages consisting of the pain and 
suffering Mrs. Berkemeir endured as a result of the injuries she sustained in the collision. 
Moreover, Hartford's argument assumes Mrs. Berkemeir's out-of-pocket expenses were 
reimbursed by the settlement and insurance proceeds Mrs. Berkemeir received. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-ll-12(l)(b), however, does not indicate any recovery obtained by an insured must first be 
applied to out-of-pocket expenses and subsequendy to all other expenses incurred. Rather, 
compensation for attorneys' fees, continued medical treatment and pain and suffering could be 
recovered from the settlement and insurance proceeds, leaving out-of-pocket medical expenses 
uncompensated. The fact that Mrs. Berkemeir died should not somehow force the Estate to 
apply the setdement and insurance proceeds to out-of-pocket expenses first, so as to alleviate 
any further claim for underinsured motorist benefits. Such an interpretation of the statute would 
eliminate the opportunity for whole relief where Hartford has stipulated to the fact that the 
setdement proceeds did not fully compensate Mrs. Berkemeir for her losses. Mrs. Berkemeir 
is entided to be made whole, before setdement proceeds should be allocated for Hartford's 
benefit. Similar to equitable principles applied to subrogation claims, the insured is entided to 
be made whole before the insurer may recover any portion of the recovery from the tortfeasor. 
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See Hillv. StateFarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 142,145 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (statinggeneral 
rule that "the insured must be made whole prior to recovery by the insurer on a subrogation 
claim"); Transamericalns. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783,786 (Utah 1972) ("Equitable principles apply 
to subrogation, and the insured is entitled to be made whole before the insurer may recover any 
portion of the recovery from the tort-feasor."); Lyon v. Hartford Accident <& Indem. Co., 25 Utah 
2d 311,480 P.2d 739,744 (1971) ("In the absence of express terms to the contrary, the insured 
is entitled to be made whole before the insurer may recover any portion of the recovery from 
the tort-feasor."), overruled on other grounds, Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 798 (Utah 
1985) (overruling Lyon as related to insurer's being held liable for breaching duty of good faith). 
Furthermore, such an interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-1 l-12(l)(b), reads into the 
statute meaning beyond its plain words. "The best evidence of the true intent and purpose of 
the legislature is the plain language of the statute." Ueberv. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2000 UT 
90,1f7,15 P.3d 1030. Accordingly, if the legislature had intended to limit the provision in such 
a manner, it would have done so explicitly. There is no case law supporting such an 
interpretation of the "out-of-pocket" provision of the statute. 
Finally, if Hartford had intended to limit underinsured motorist coverage to out-of-
pocket expenses and require any insurance benefits received by the insured to be applied to out-
of-pocket expenses first, it should have drafted such a provision into the insurance contract. In 
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"Insurance policies should be strictly construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured 
because they are adhesion contracts drafted by insurance companies." Id. at 522. The Court 
also explained that "insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and 
their beneficiaries so as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance. Id. at 521-22 
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(citations omitted) (emphasis added). To allow Hartford to limit the protection afforded an 
insured or her beneficiaries, is not only inconsistent with the insurance policy Mrs. Berkemeir 
purchased from Hartford, but contrary to the longstanding policy of the Utah Supreme Court, 
to interpret such contracts of adhesion liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries. 
Because Mr. Alexander's policy with Allstate did not fully compensate Mrs. Berkemeir's 
out-of-pocket expenses, Mr. Alexander was an underinsured motorist and Hartford is obligated 
to pay the Estate underinsured motorist benefits. Such payment would not result in a windfall 
for the Estate or an impermissible duplicate payment, where the parties have stipulated: "Due 
to the amount of Berkemeir's damages, if she were still alive, the settlement with Allstate would 
not have fully compensated her for her loss," and the insurance policy defines an "underinsured 
motor vehicle" as a "vehicle . . . to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the 
time of the accident but the amount paid for bodily injury under that bond or policy is not 
enough to pay the full amount the insured is legally entitled to recover." (R.73:Policy, Part C 
Section III, Insuring Agreement, f^ C (emphasis added)). The Estate is legally entitled to recover 
her out-of-pocket medical expenses because it has not yet been fully compensated for Mrs. 
Berkemeir's out-of-pocket medical expenses, precluding the possibility of a windfall or duplicate 
payment. 
In conjunction with reimbursement for out-of-pocket medical expenses, the Estate is 
entided to recover interest on the special damages Mrs. Berkemeir incurred as a result of the 
collision. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44 provides that plaintiffs in personal injury actions brought 
to recover damages "may claim interest on the special damages actually incurred from the date 
of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action." 
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In Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted Section 78-27-44, utilizing the legislative history of the 
provision and stating: "Special damages are the expenses paid for those who are injured so they 
can immediately receive necessary medical and hospital care." Id. at 672 (citing Utah House of 
Reps. Tr. of 2nd and 3rd reading of S.B. 153, March 13, 1975). The court further explained: 
"'Getting interest on their out-of-pocket expenses will provide a total recoupment of any 
expenses they have had from the time of the accident until they are paid in full by recovery at 
court or by settlement/" Id. (quoting Utah House of Reps. Tr. of 2nd and 3rd reading of S.B. 153, 
March 13,1975). 
Therefore, if the Estate's claim is based in personal injury law under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-11-12, the occurrence which gave rise to the current cause of action was the collision of 
October 16, 1995, wherein Mrs. Berkemeir sustained personal injuries as a result of Mr. 
Alexander's negligence. As a result, the Estate is entitled to interest on Mrs. Berkemeir's special 
damages, or out-of-pocket medical expenses, from October 16,1995, to the present. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents an opportunity for this Court to interpret the UIM provision 
contained in most automobile insurance policies in the situation where the insured dies prior to 
the time an arbitration award under the policy is entered. Applying standards for the 
interpretation of insurance policies, and focusing upon when a cause of action for breach of 
contract accrues, it becomes clear that Mrs. Berkemeir's damages are measured as of the date of 
Hartford's breach of the insurance policy, when Hartford refused to pay all or any portion of 
the insurance coverage to Mrs. Berkemeir, despite her demand. As a result, Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 78-11-12 does not apply to the facts of this case, and the Estate was entided to Summary 
Judgment as a matter of law. 
This Court should affirm the Trial court's Order Granting the Estate's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment and Denying Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 7, 
2001, and filed on May 7,2001. (R. 189-196) and affirm the Court of Appeals Decision in Estate 
o/Berkemeirex rel Nielsen v. Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest, 2003 UT App 78, 67 P.3d 
1012. 
Dated: September 18, 2003. 
LARSEN & GRUBER 
Mark A. Lafrsen 
Lisa C. Rico 
Stacy J. McNeill 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on September 18,2003, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellee, the Estate of Dorothy Berkemeir were mailed to the following: 
Mark L. Anderson 
KarraJ. Porter 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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ADDENDUM 
Stipulation as to Facts and Legal Positions of Parties (R. 18 - R. 27) 
Mark A. Larsen (3727) 
Joleen S. Mantas (8562) 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-6500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Mark L. Anderson (5185) 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 323-5000 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF DOROTHY 
BERKEMEIR, by and through its 
Executor, KAREN NIELSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF THE MIDWEST, 
STIPULATION AS TO FACTS 
AND LEGAL POSITIONS OF 
PARTIES 
Civil No. 990911059 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendant. 
The Estate of Dorothy Berkemeir, by and through its Executor Karen Nielsen, 
("Berkemeir Estate") and Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest ("Hartford") stipulate 
to the following: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. The decedent Dorothy Berkemeir ("Ms. Berkemeir") was a resident of Salt 
Lake County, Utah. Ms. Berkemeir died on August 15, 1997. 
2. Plaintiff Karen Nielsen, a resident of Summit County, Utah, is the properly 
appointed executor of the Estate of Dorothy Berkemeir (the "Berkemeir Estate"). 
3. Defendant Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest ("Hartford") is a 
foreign corporation conducting business as an insurance company and validly licensed to do 
business in Utah with the Utah Department of Insurance. 
4. The matter in controversy is in excess of $20,000.00, and the claims arose in 
Salt Lake County, although Hartford disputes that the Berkemeir Estate is entitled to recover 
any sums at all, including but not limited to sums in excess of $20,000.00. 
5. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4, and venue is 
proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-4 and § 78-13-7. 
FACTS 
6. On October 16, 1995, Ms. Berkemeir was a passenger in her vehicle, traveling 
in an easterly direction in the left lane of Interstate 80, approximately nine miles west of 
Cheyenne, Wyoming. 
2 
7. Ms. Berkemeir's vehicle was being driven by her daughter, Mary Davis. 
8. Ms. Berkemeir's vehicle was covered by a personal automobile insurance policy 
issued by Hartford, effective January 24, 1995 to January 24, 1996, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint filed herein. 
9. James Alexander, a Washington resident, was operating his vehicle in an 
easterly direction in the right lane of Interstate 80, when he suddenly turned directly in front of 
Ms. Berkemeir's vehicle. 
10. The driver of Ms. Berkemeir's vehicle was unable to avoid striking Mr. 
Alexander's vehicle. 
11. As a direct and proximate result of Mr. Alexander's negligence, Ms. Berkemeir 
sustained personal injuries, incurred medical expenses, and was subjected to and endured pain 
and suffering. 
12. The medical expenses incurred by Ms. Berkemeir as a proximate result of the 
accident total $ 38,249.29.l 
1
 This is the amount claimed by the Berkemeir Estate in its Complaint. Hartford will assume that 
amount to be correct solely for purposes of its Motion for Summary Judgment that will be filed in this 
action. The parties cannot presently stipulate to the specific amount of medical expenses incurred by 
Ms. Berkemeir and her Estate that were covered and/or paid by insurance. If the Court determines 
that this figure is necessary to resolve the parties' motions for summary judgment, the determination of 
this issue is reserved for a later time. 
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13. On October 9, 1996, Ms. Berkemeir executed a settlement agreement and 
release with Mr. Alexander in exchange for the full $50,000 policy limits of his liability 
insurance policy with Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). 
14. Due to the amount of Ms. Berkemeir's damages, if she were still alive, the 
settlement with Allstate would not have fully compensated her for her loss. 
15. Ms. Berkemeir's auto policy from Hartford (the "Policy") extended coverage 
for medical payments and personal injury protection (Policy, Part B). Hartford paid the 
medical payment limit of $5,000 under this coverage provision of the Policy. Hartford also 
paid the personal injury protection limit of $5,000 under this coverage provision. Payments 
made by Hartford under Part B of the Policy totaled $10,000. All Part B payments were 
directed to reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by Mrs. Berkemeir as a result of the 
automobile accident of October 16, 1995. 
16. The Policy also extended underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage to Ms. 
Berkemeir, with limits of $100,000 per person (Policy, Part C, Section III). The following 
provisions applicable to UIM coverage are included in the Policy: 
• We will pay compensatory damages which an insured is 
legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury: 
1. Sustained by an insured; and 
2. Caused by an accident. 
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The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 
underinsured motor vehicle. 
(Policy, Part C, Section III, Insuring Agreement, paragraph A, at p. 14) 
• "Underinsured motor vehicle" means a land motor vehicle . . 
. of any type to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident but the amount paid for 
bodily injury under that bond or policy to an insured is not 
enough to pay the full amount the insured is legally entitled to 
recover as damages. 
(Policy, Part C, Section III, paragraph C, at p. 15) 
• We will not make a duplicate payment under this coverage for 
any element of loss for which payment has been made by or 
on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally 
responsible. 
(Policy, Section III, Limit of Liability, paragraph C, at p. 16) 
17. Ms. Berkemeir made demand upon Hartford for payment of the $100,000 limits 
under her UIM coverage, resulting in an arbitration proceeding originally scheduled to begin 
on July 21, 1997. The hearing was subsequently rescheduled for September 23, 1997 because 
of an independent medical examination of Ms. Berkemeir that had to be rescheduled. 
18. Ms. Berkemeir died on August 15, 1997 of causes unrelated to the automobile 
accident of October 16, 1995. 
19. After Ms. Berkemeir's death and prior to the rescheduled arbitration 
proceeding, the Berkemeir Estate demanded payment from Hartford of $45,580.40 under the 
UIM coverage as a contractual claim against the Policy. 
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20. Hartford denied the Berkemeir Estate's contractual claim against the Policy in 
light of its interpretation of applicable Utah law, and Ms. Berkemeir's death. In part, 
Hartford's denial of the claim was based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1), which states: 
(a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the 
person or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of 
another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer or the 
injured person. The injured person or the personal representative 
or heirs of the person who died have a cause of action against the 
wrong doer for special and general damages, subject to 
Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured person 
dies as a result of a cause other than the injury received as a 
result of the wrongful act or negligence of the wrongdoer, the 
personal representatives or heirs of that person are entitled to 
receive no more than the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or 
on behalf of that injured person as the result of his injury. 
21. After Ms. Berkemeir's demise Hartford withdrew its demand to arbitrate, 
believing that there was no benefit owing to the Berkemeir Estate because of Ms. Berkemeir's 
death from causes unrelated to the accident. The Berkemeir Estate then filed this action. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR DECISION 
22. The disputes in this case focus on: 
a) whether Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) is controlling; 
b) whether Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) bars the Berkemeir Estate's UIM 
claim against the Policy; 
c) whether the Berkemeir Estate's claim is contractual in nature; 
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d) whether the claim arises out of personal injury within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-11-12(1); 
e) whether the medical expenses incurred by Ms. Berkemeir are "out-of-pocket 
expenses" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1); 
f) whether the Alexander vehicle is "underinsured" within the meaning of the 
Policy; and 
g) whether the Berkemeir Estate is legally entitled to recover any UIM benefits 
from Hartford given the Policy language, applicable Utah law, Ms. Berkemeir's 
demise, her prior settlement with Allstate, and the payments Hartford made under Part 
B of the Policy. 
LEGAL POSITION OF BERKEMEIR ESTATE 
23. If Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) is not controlling, pursuant to the terms of the 
Policy, the Berkemeir Estate claims that Hartford is indebted to the Berkemeir Estate in the 
amount of $100,000 and has damaged the Berkemeir Estate in that amount by failing to pay 
that sum, in addition to interest. 
24. Upon her death, if Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) is applicable, the Berkemeir 
Estate alternatively claims payment under the UIM coverage as a contractual claim against the 
Policy, "out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of that injured person as a result of 
his injury" of the medical expenses necessarily incurred as a result of the October 16, 1995, 
collision, in addition to interest. In this regard, the Berkemeir Estate claims that the "out-of-
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pocket" expenses it is entitled to recover consist of medical expenses totaling $38,249.29 paid 
by Ms. Berkemeir or paid by others on her behalf. 
25. If Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) is applicable, the Berkemeir Estate is entitled 
to interest on the medical expenses at the rate of ten percent per annum from the date of the 
accident, October 16, 1995. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44. 
LEGAL POSITION OF HARTFORD 
26. Under the Hartford Policy, the Estate is entitled to recover from Hartford what 
Dorothy Berkemeir would have been "legally entitled" to recover from Alexander if he had 
unlimited liability coverage (see 116). 
27. Ms. Berkemeir died of causes unrelated to the accident (see 118). 
28. Utah Code Ann. §78-11-12(1) determines what an estate is legally entitled to 
recover from a tortfeasor if the plaintiff died from causes that were not related to the accident. 
By its terms, this statute applies to "causes of action arising out of personal injury." (See 
120). Therefore, the statute applies to this case, since the Estate's claim for UIM benefits is a 
cause of action that arises out of personal injuries sustained by Ms. Berkemeir (see 1111, 17). 
By its terms, the statute limits the Estate's claims against Hartford to "out-of-pocket 
expenses." (See 120). 
29. Hartford is entitled to summary judgment in this action on two separate but 
related grounds: 
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• First: The maximum amount of out-of-pocket expenses claimed by the 
Estate is $38,249.29 (see 112). This amount is less than the $50,000 limits of Alexander's 
Allstate policy (see 113). Hartford's Policy obligates it to pay UIM benefits only when the 
accident was caused by an "underinsured motor vehicle," which is contractually defined as a 
vehicle that is covered by a bodily injury liability policy with a limit that is "not enough to pay 
the full amount the insured is legally entitled to recover as damages." (See if 16). Because the 
limits of Alexander's policy exceed the maximum recoverable special damages incurred by Ms. 
Berkemeir and her Estate, Alexander was not operating an "underinsured motor vehicle" when 
the accident occurred. Therefore, the Estate is not entitled to UIM benefits under the Hartford 
Policy. 
• Second: The UIM portion of the Hartford Policy states that Hartford 
will not make a "duplicate payment . . . for any element of loss for which payment has been 
made by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible." (See ^16). 
Ms. Berkemeir has already received $60,000 for her loss ($50,000 from Allstate on 
Alexander's behalf, and $10,000 from Hartford) (see 1113 and 15). These payments constitute 
an "element of loss for which payment has been made . . . " Accordingly, the UIM portion of 
the Hartford Policy is not implicated in this matter until the Estate's recoverable damages 
exceed $60,000. It is undisputed that the maximum amount of out-of-pocket expenses claimed 
by the Estate is less than $60,000 (see f 12). Therefore, Hartford owes no UIM benefits to the 
Estate as a matter of law. 
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30. In the event the Court finds that the Estate is entitled to recover some 
amount of out-of-pocket expenses, such expenses are not the total amount of medical expenses 
incurred by Ms. Berkemeir and her Estate because of the accident. Rather, "out-of-pocket 
expenses" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) are limited to medical 
expenses that were actually paid by Ms. Berkemeir or her Estate, and for which no 
reimbursement was received. 
31. In the event the Court awards some out-of-pocket expenses to the Plaintiff, the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44, pertaining to interest thereon, are applicable. 
Dated: August I1" ,2000 <ft, 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C 
lark t . Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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